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Abstract 
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characteristics of Smartgrids are also explored with the aim of identifying potential vulnerabilities. 
                                                 
1 elizaveta.kuznetsova@uvsq.fr 
2
  keith.culver@universud-paris.fr 
3
 enrico.zio@ecp.fr, enrico.zio@supelec.fr 
4
 enrico.zio@polimit.it 
2 
 
We additionally discuss the assumptions, limitations and degree of precision of Smartgrids 
modeling. 
Keywords: complex engineered system, Smartgrids, vulnerability. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we look at Smartgrid systems from the point of view of their complexity and 
vulnerability related to their characteristics. The framework of analysis is similar to that of other 
engineered complex systems, e.g. transportation infrastructures, energy networks, 
telecommunication systems. These systems are characterized by a large number of elements with 
complex interconnections, nonlinear and discontinuous operation, and the involvement of multiple 
actors with diverse backgrounds. Further, uncertainties typically exist in the characterization of the 
system elements and their interconnections (Rouse, 2003). As a result, the modeling and analysis of 
such systems by reductionist methods are likely to fail, and holistic approaches are needed. 
In the context of such complex systems, while it is true that their structural backbones are created 
by the engineers who develop the constituent components of the system, the connections of such 
components within the systems are not necessarily all ‘designed.’  In many instances, undersigned 
or even undesired connections ‘emerge’ from system evolution so as to meet the demand under 
given operation constraints (Ottino, 2004). Complex systems can be said to evolve from the design 
blueprints to complex structures and behaviors through engineering, updating and integration 
processes. At the engineering process level, elements are assembled by design to provide optimal, 
consistent and reliable operation, as well as functional safety (Ottino, 2004). In general, this is 
achieved with engineered systems which may be complicated but not yet complex (Ottino, 2004). 
The engineering process is usually organized by hierarchical methods in top-down approaches, 
managed on a linear timeline organization (Rouse, 2003). In principle, the final product of such 
process could be reduced to pieces and reassembled, without losing its function. Vulnerability may 
arise in these systems, particularly from designed defects due to calculation errors or simplifications 
during the design process.   
 As the system ‘lives’, its updating and integration occurs by insertion of new technology and 
extension of capacity to meet service demands with the required performance. This creates a need 
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for connection between the engineering of the system and the ever-changing domains of society, 
economy, legislation and politics, which determine service demands and generate constraints. In 
virtue of this connection, the originally complicated engineered system becomes complex with 
hallmarks of adaptation, self-organization and emergent behavior, which constitute opportunities 
but pose also vulnerabilities, mostly due to unforeseen complication during the integration process 
(Ottino, 2004).  
One classic example of a complex system is the Internet. Initially built in the United States in the 
middle of the 20th century as an information technology tool for anti-missile purposes, the Internet 
has become pervasive.  It now penetrates our offices, houses and public spaces, supported by the 
increasing use of personal computing devices. Today, the Internet is a global platform for 
commercial and social interactions, used regularly by 20% of the world’s population in 2008 
(OECD, 2008). Using widespread and standard engineering services with easy access to 
information, communication and data sharing, the Internet increases the efficiency of economic 
activities and considerably increases social interactions (OECD, 2008). Its evolution continuously 
demands creation of new policy frameworks, to “encourage innovation, growth and change, and 
develop appropriate governance that does not stifle creativity or affects the openness of the 
Internet” (OECD, 2008). As a backbone and enabler of convergence across multiple fields 
(engineering, social, economic, finance and policies), the Internet is a good example of a complex 
engineered system.  
Returning to the concept of a Smartgrid, this term is used to identify the architecture of emerging 
new energy infrastructures, which use ICT-driven interconnectedness to achieve several goals.  
These goals include improvements to coordination of energy generation by diverse energy sources 
(including renewables); improved transmission and distribution for increased efficiency to meet 
increasing demand, and improved design to ensure protection and resiliency to the vulnerabilities of 
aging and failing components, natural disasters and human attacks. At regional, national and world 
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levels, Smartgrid research, development and demonstration is working toward achieving these goals 
by creating interconnections between energy infrastructure elements, such as producers and 
consumers, and further introducing intelligent management of electricity balance in the grid (Coll-
Mayor, Paget, & Lightner, 2007; Hammons, 2008).  
The Internet is particularly relevant as reference complex system in our exploration of Smartgrids. 
In a sense, the Smartgrid concept may be regarded as referring to a kind of 'Internet of Energy.'  
While using the Internet as the basis of connection between various elements of the energy grid, the 
Smartgrid concept additionally borrows from the Internet in the way Smartgrids conceive of the 
energy grid.  Smartgrids, just like the Internet, aim at creating a global, interconnected network of 
energy actors, while at the same time going further by monitoring, managing and optimizing energy 
flows. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the complexity of Smartgrid 
systems in terms of ‘typical’ characteristics of complex systems and categorizes these 
characteristics as engineering, updating and integration processes. Further analysis identifies 
potential vulnerabilities associated with each characteristic. Section 2 concludes with a nominal 
ranking of potential vulnerabilities. Section 3 describes methods available for Smartgrids analysis 
aimed at modeling of characteristics illustrated in previous sections. The last section of the paper 
provides conclusions and further discussion of strategies for modeling and analysis of Smartgrids 
complexity. 
2. Identification of Smartgrids complexity 
In order to understand the complexity level of Smartgrids, this Section recalls classical general 
characteristics of complex systems (Figure 1), from the point of view of both topological and 
behavioral properties. Properties of particular relevance for Smartgrids are emphasized. Each 
characteristic will be further analyzed from the point of view of Smartgrids and allocated to groups 
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enabling identification of primary sources of system vulnerability related to the processes of 
engineering, updating and integration.  
 
Figure 1: Characteristics of complex systems (NESCI, 2005). 
2.1. Characteristics of complexity in Smartgrids 
	ABACB
System architecture is the core characteristic defining the topological and/or logic structure linking 
the elements of the system through their interrelations. System architecture is therefore responsible 
for system behavioral features such as adaptive learning, emergence and evolution. A common 
structure is hierarchical organization, typical for ecological, taxonomic, genealogical and somatic 
organization of biological systems. The adaptive and evolutionary mechanisms of organisms of 
such systems, trying to maintain or increase their fitness in the face of changing environmental 
conditions, are driven by their hierarchical structural-interactive architecture (Nederbragt, 1997). 
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Complex engineered systems, such as the Internet, manifest pronounced hierarchical structuring 
with highly connected nodes related to “isolated sub-systems, forming a mantle-like mass of peer-
connected nodes” (Duncan, 2007). Apart from the presence of hierarchical interdependencies, the 
overall system structuring itself and the wiring of the different elements in it is very complex to 
model. Currently, many empirical and theoretical approaches attempt to analyze the structure of 
complex networks by graph theory of different levels of abstraction – unweighted graphs for pure 
topological characterization, weighted graphs for attributing physical meaning to the connections, 
planar graphs to account for physical constraints. Typical categorization based on the nodes 
connectivity distribution considers free-scale (inhomogeneous) networks, and small-world and 
random (homogeneous) networks. In this view, the architecture of Smartgrid systems is considered 
to be a relevant feature of future electricity networks, which needs careful consideration for its 
possible influence in the system’s evolution and adaptation. On the other hand, system architecture 
not only lays down the topological map of system structure, but also allows taking into account the 
differences between its elements and connections, which are heterogeneous physically, functionally 
and in role. 
DBABEFBB	AEBBBAEBA	E
Heterogeneity refers to the differences in the elements, their interconnections and roles within the 
system hierarchical organization, often with high-connected core elements and low-connected 
periphery nodes. Heterogeneity is strong in current electricity systems, with in architectures in the 
form of hierarchical trees where production facilities are connected by centralized high-voltage 
transmission stems to transformation substations linked in their turn by distribution branches to 
final consumers. Notably, Smartgrid systems aim at evolving towards more decentralized 
architectures, with a more homogeneous distribution of heterogeneous production sources of 
different nature and size, including renewable energies. These will need to penetrate the network at 
all levels, homogeneously. The arising grid pattern forms a sort of neural or vascular system, 
manifesting in some conditions structured into self-similarities.   
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B			A	B
Also called fractals, self-similarities are complex system structures as "a rough or fragmented 
geometric shape that can be split into parts, each of which is (at least approximately) a reduced-size 
copy of the whole" (Mandelbrot, 1982).  Where self-similarities are present in a complex system, 
they amount to the presence of similar properties at all hierarchical levels, similar complexities at 
different scales without a unique characteristic size for their structures. Assertion of the existence of 
a fractal structure in a given complex system depends on the possibility of ascribing to that structure 
specific dimensionless numbers indicating the nature of self-similarity in the structure or behavior 
in the complex system. The dimensionless quantification of a fractal structure permits fractals to 
exhibit the property of scalability. These aspects of fractals are expressed in an instructive structural 
analogy between a human biological circulatory system and the Internet.  The principle of fractal 
structuring of veins, characterized by an efficient mechanism of blood distribution with minimum 
structure and shortest path, was borrowed to study the optimal design of the Internet network 
(Caldarelli, Marchetti, & Pietronero, 2000). A further structural analogy can be found in the 
extension of the Internet concept into Smartgrid networks.  The Smartgrid concept exhibits fractal 
structuring insofar as a particular Smartgrid may contain an ‘energy automation network’ for 
‘positive energy building’ inside district Smartgrids, district Smartgrids inside city Smartgrids and 
so forth. Here, the ‘energy automation network’ constitutes the mini Smartgrid network, involving 
consumers, local renewable energy producers, transportation and storage facilities. Smartgrids for 
‘positive energy building’ manifest clear periodical self-similarities, with district Smartgrids 
included in energy flows management with respect to day and season energy demand fluctuations. 
Certainly, self-similarities appear as an evident characteristic of Smartgrids system structuring. 
BEF	A	EBEE		A
Two other characteristics related to the structure of engineered systems are decomposability and 
self-organization. The former relates to the divisibility of the system structure into subsystems, and 
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into further separate elementary elements. Electricity grids seem to exhibit a structural property of 
decomposability, especially evident within the fractal patterns envisioned for Smartgrids structures.  
Self-organization refers mostly to the behavioral feature of a complex system capable of re-
organizing its isolated elements and subsystems into coherent patterns without intervention from 
external influences or a central authority.  For example, the open system of the Internet, affected by 
a continuous growth in the number of components and by technologies evolution, tends to self-
organize into stable patterns through the creation of particular niches of services or user ‘coalitions.’ 
Such flexibility allows the Internet to adapt continuously to changes in the local environment, while 
maintaining coherence of structure and reliability of service (Granic, 2000). In this sense, self-
organization constitutes mostly an adaptive and evolution property of complex dynamic systems, 
spontaneously emerging from the interactions of the different system components. In this view, the 
possibility that Smartgrids will possess such complexity will depend on the level of autonomy of 
the system from other systems, and the number and dynamics of Smartgrids users. For the moment, 
the role and involvement of consumers in the mechanisms of the electricity network management 
are not clearly defined, but the potential for failure-resilient self-organization, responsible for other 
properties such as emergence, adaptive learning and evolution, is ripe for exploitation. 
 BFBB
Induced by the complex non-linear interconnections between the separate system elements, 
subsystems and fractals at a micro level, emergence is a property of complex systems, which 
appears only at a macro level manifesting itself by the arising of novel and coherent structures, 
patterns and behavioral properties (Goldstein, 1999). Mainly due to self-organization processes, 
emergent behavior appears more evident in complex dynamic systems without a clear central 
authority, where some even small local changes evolve into unpredictable forms of high-level 
organization and behavior. In the case of the Internet, social bookmarking or tagging leads to an 
emergent effect in which information resources are re-organized according to users’ priorities. 
Social networks are not only used for networking with friends, but are also exploited for gathering 
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and communicating relevant users’ information, or coordinating system-wide actions of entire 
segments of population: the recent dramatic facts related to revolutions in Northern Africa countries 
and acts of terrorism in Russia prove how in some countries liberty of speech is tolerated only in 
social blogs, and manifestation or rescue expeditions in emergency situations are organized directly 
by massive use of the Internet. Electricity grids have also shown emergent behavior in the past, 
where local failures have evolved into unexpected cascade failure patterns with transnational, cross-
industry effects. In this sense, Smartgrids are also expected to be characterized by emergent 
behavior, also in connection to the above mentioned self-organization mechanisms of complex 
systems and depending to the extent and type of active involvement of users in the energy 
management process. 
!A	"BB	F
Adaptive learning allows a system to adjust its architecture and behavior into a stable coherent 
pattern under external pressures, using long-term memory experience feedback to anticipate future 
unfavorable changes in system functioning. This adaptation process is made possible by a set of 
internal mechanisms, named detectors and effectors (NESCI, 2005). The system collects the 
information on acting external pressures through the detectors. Then, effectors, such as locomotion, 
communication, manipulation and expulsion, actively change the state of certain components, 
subsystems and/or their interrelations to keep the system in equilibrium under the acting external 
forces. Feedback mechanisms play an indispensable role for the anticipation of future changes in 
support of system equilibrium. The dynamic feedback and learning process provides changes in 
time to the system components and their interrelations through the successive consideration and 
evaluation of external and internal factors (NESCI, 2005). In complex engineered systems like the 
Internet, the adaptive learning process partly relies on the ability of self-organization driven by local 
changes. As the Smartgrid concept strongly relies on a system of intelligent and sustainable 
management of power flows, adaptive learning mechanisms are expected to be a central feature of 
design, operation and control.  
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# "ECA	EFE$AB	
When the external pressures applied to a system exceed ‘critical values’ beyond which adaptive 
learning mechanisms are inefficient, the system is forced to evolve. In the absence of a central 
authority governing system changes, the evolutionary process resembles natural selection in 
biological systems resulting in the consequent disappearance of elements associated with low 
adaptive fitness. The Internet, for example, is the product of the evolution of its constitutive 
software and hardware technologies, information and communication services and applications, and 
also faces the creation of new ways of use, such as e-commerce. Unlike biological systems, 
complex engineered systems are also exposed to constant growth of user portfolios. Future 
Smartgrid complex systems will both evolve in the way typical of analogous biological systems, 
and they will incorporate unanticipated new elements.  
%&E
Chaos theory is used to describe and explain various processes occurring in complex systems, e.g. 
earth atmosphere and aerodynamics processes (Baas, 2002; Macek, 2010), chemical processes (Lee, 
1996) and information and communication processes (Chen, Wang, & Han, 2004). In these 
processes chaos is used to characterize the capacity of non-linear dynamic systems to produce an 
unpredictable change in large-scale behavior or a sudden shift in system pattern, in response to fine-
scale changes in initial conditions (Baas, 2002). Hence, the well-known aphorism, that butterfly 
wings flapping can cause a tornado (Lorenz, 1987). Engineered chaotic systems are characterized 
by high sensitivity to changes, but also by mixing and periodicity. These two last properties are 
mainly responsible for the formation of complex fractal structures as a manifestation of chaotic 
properties within a complex system. On the other hand, the fractal structure resulting in ‘positive 
energy building’ within Smartgrids is more a man-made structuring aimed at facilitating electricity 
flows management than an emerging result of chaotic evolution. However, even if Smartgrids 
patterns will be mainly characterized by ‘artificial’ structuring, some periodic daily or seasonal self-
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similarities, for example in energy consumption behavior between building and district Smartgrids, 
are likely to arise in manifestation of chaotic behavioral patterns. 
'(CA				BA	E
Multidisciplinary relations are an integral part of engineered complex systems. Smartgrids in 
particular involve a number of engineering and non-engineering disciplines for defining the 
successful implementation of new energy systems, e.g. by creation of necessary legislative 
frameworks for technologies use, finding adequate finance models for innovative projects 
elaboration, providing incentive support and elaboration of standards, and securing social 
acceptance and participation.  
)*FCBEC	B
Through the integration process, complex engineered systems become open systems with 
interactions with the environment. Their multiple relations with non-engineering domains and with 
other engineered systems result in difficulties of boundary definition. Necessarily, then the 
modeling of the complex system limits depends on the observer’s scope of analysis rather than an 
intrinsic property of the system.  In some associated analyses of analogous systems, other 
organizational categories are proposed.  For example, in legal theory, some theorists argue that 
while the law of countries is usefully characterized as systemic, international law lacks a systemic 
quality and is better described as an ‘order’ which interacts with national legal systems.  This 
example illustrates the extent to which ascription of ‘system qualities’ may depend on the purposes 
and initial scope analysis of investigators, rather than any inherent features of the phenomena which 
in practice, as in the case of international and national law, may appear seamlessly interlinked 
(Culver & Giudice, 2010).  
BB	FAA+B	AB
As discussed above, Smartgrids potentially exhibit a number of topological and behavioral 
characteristics typical of complex systems. In addition, they are intended to have specific 
characteristics arguably conceived as core to the Smartgrids concept: according to a popular vision 
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of ‘intelligent electricity grids’, they will possess a range of additional properties such as self-
healing and resistance to external natural disasters and human attacks (Battaglini, Lilliestam, Haas, 
& Patt, 2009; Breuer, Povh, Retzmann, Urbanke, & Weinhold, 2007; Chassin, 2010; Fox-Penner, 
2010). These two particular characteristics are related to adaptive learning and evolutionary 
mechanisms. However, to mark their importance for the Smartgrid concept we will consider these 
properties apart.  
2.2. Categorization of Smartgrids complexity characteristics 
In order to explore and explain the complexity of Smartgrids, this Section maps the characteristics 
of complexity discussed in Section 2.1 into three major categories – inherent, challenge-response, 
and acquired characteristics (Table 1). These categories are defined in relation to the three 
processes of engineering, updating and integration of complex engineered systems. The first 
inherent category contains characteristics of Smartgrid systems designed at the engineering process 
level. Properties such as the heterogeneity of elements and connections as well as system 
architecture, are considered as inherent characteristics of system complexity amenable to control 
and, therefore, of minimum uncertainty impact on Smartgrid functioning.  The second category 
includes challenge-response characteristics. Inspired by the underlying Smartgrids strategy of a 
flexible and transparent energy management concept for the reinforcement of electricity 
infrastructure reliability (Hledik, 2009), these characteristics result from the continuous updating 
process in response to the evolution of the challenges to the Smartgrid function. In this context, 
adaptive learning and self-healing are desirable prospective characteristics for effective challenge-
response by smart electricity infrastructures. Due to the uncertain and somewhat unpredictable 
evolving environment, the challenge-response properties of Smartgrids could not be guaranteed 
through design process, and their achievement is a challenge itself. Eventually, the third category of 
acquired characteristics includes self-organization, emergence and chaos which arise as a 
consequence of the integration of the system in the complex socio-economical environment which 
14 
 
drives its functioning. This category regroups the major sources of uncertainty on the functioning of 
Smartgrids.  
Table 1 
Categorization of Smartgrids complexity characteristics 
Smartgrids complexity characteristics 
Inherent  
(engineering) 
Challenge-response 
(updating) 
Acquired  
(integration) 
Architecture Adaptive learning Vague boundaries 
Heterogeneity Evolution and growth Self-organization 
Self-similarities Self-healing Emergence 
Decomposability Attack resistance Chaos  
  Multidisciplinary 
relations 
 
Note that this categorization may not be exclusive as some characteristics could be mapped into 
more than one category. For example, evolution could be considered as both a challenge-response 
and acquired characteristic. On the one hand, this property can provide Smartgrids the challenge-
response characteristic needed for flexibility in handling the uncertain stresses upon the system. On 
the other hand, evolution may have uncertain negative effects on Smartgrids functioning resulting 
in increasing of vulnerabilities and incapability to correctly respond to challenges of electricity 
demand. This may occur under specified conditions: as in the next Section, characteristics such as 
adaptive learning, evolution and growth can not only produce a positive impact on the Smartgrid 
functioning, but can also turn into vulnerabilities in the absence of a central authority. 
In this respect, not only the uncertain properties of the acquired category, but also inherent complex 
system characteristics could become vulnerability sources. For example, topological properties of 
Smartgrids could induce behavioral vulnerability by facilitating disturbance propagation within the 
network of connections, giving rise to cascading processes which would impair system functioning. 
This leads to the need to identify sources of potential vulnerability within the system characteristics, 
and ranking them according to their impact on Smartgrids development and functioning.    
2.3. Mapping complexity into vulnerability 
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This Section points at potential vulnerabilities hidden in the complexity characteristics of 
Smartgrids. 
	ABACB
As mentioned above, Smartgrid systems will be developed mainly on the backbone of existing 
infrastructures. Traditional electricity grid architecture is organized in a strong hierarchical 
infrastructure with only few centralized electricity transmission channels from energy producers to 
load consumers (Figure 2a). This type of organization is characterized by unidirectional power flow 
and vertical control and operation. This centralized hierarchical structure is widely used for systems 
modeling and presents a relatively transparent system organization with clearly identifiable 
elements of topology, purpose and control.  This system structure is regarded as supplying 
organizational advantages and facilitating system monitoring, fault detection and correction (Pattee, 
1973). Current electricity architecture defines clearly an authority domain and a role for each actor 
on the energy market, as well as operation and interaction modes between the diverse elements. In 
this view, the major vulnerability of electricity grids architecture comes from their scale-free 
organization standing on a limited number of core, highly connected nodes of production sources 
and few unidirectional transmission channels through which cascading failure propagation may 
occur in the absence of bypass transmission (Hines, Blumsack, Cotilla Sanchez, & Barrows, 2010; 
Rosas I Casals, 2009; Zio, 2007).  
 
a) 
 
b) 
Producers 
Transmission & 
Distribution 
Consumers 
Failure isolation 
Power rerouting 
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Figure 2: a) Centralized hierarchical structure; b) Failure isolation in homogeneously 
distributed networks. 
 
Smartgrids design is likely to implement a structure with more homogeneous connected nodes 
(Figure 2b), capable to reroute power supply and isolate undamaged lines (Rosas I Casals, 2009).  
DBABEFBB	AEBBBAEBA	E
Strong heterogeneity of elements and connections in current electricity grids, which will serve the 
foundation for Smartgrids, is translated into high sensitivity to direct attacks on a node or 
connection (Crucitti, 2003; Zio, 2007). The high vulnerability to direct attacks of scale-free 
networks can be smoothed by allocating supplemental connections and elements for a more 
homogeneously distributed architecture. In homogeneous networks, the networks’ tolerance of 
errors is similar for the case of random failures and direct attacks, independent of network size 
(Rosas-Casals, Valverde, & Solé, 2007).  
B			A	B
Looking at fractal properties for engineering and non-engineering complex systems, it appears that 
it is not the presence of self-similarities, but rather their absence which may render Smartgrids 
vulnerable (Caldarelli, Marchetti, & Pietronero, 2000; Goldberger & West, 1987; Krummel et al., 
2008; Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2006). For example, there are nearly no fractals in the current scale-
free architecture of electricity grids connected with energy production to form the core production 
sub-system. In this setting, a direct attack on a production hub may result in the failure of the core 
production sub-system (Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2006). For this reason, Smartgrids are likely to 
seek fractal architectures, where consumers are regrouped around distributed production sources 
without strong connections with other production hubs. This needs to emerge from more sustainable 
evolution and growth mechanisms of the system (Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2006).  
BEF	A	EBEE		A
By enabling ‘disassembly’ of a complex system into its subsystems and their components, 
decomposability allows understanding and categorization of system elements. Low decomposability 
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implies potential vulnerability as the system is characterized by massive elements with limited 
capacity for adaptation and evolution in response to nearly emerging challenges. On the other hand, 
high decomposability translates into a large number of components, connections and interrelations, 
which may make the system difficult to control, and thus vulnerable. Another situation of 
vulnerability may arise from significant variations of decomposability level across the Smartgrid, 
resulting in system stiffness and possible instabilities.   
As for the self-organization process, its impact is significant in systems without central authority; 
for Smartgrids it may turn into vulnerability depending on the extent and type of active involvement 
of users. 
 BFBB
A situation in which a large amount of information is exchanged within technologies at a period of 
high electricity demand, can lead to a vulnerable condition of the system, similar to Internet 
networks and information traffic congestion (Chen, Wang, & Han, 2004). This emergent behavior 
could be driven by small changes in users behavior and result in grid dysfunction.  However, 
emergence can also offer opportunities to find resilient solutions in the recombination of evolved 
structures and processes, renewal of system components and new connection trajectories to satisfy 
demands (Rosas I Casals, 2009). For Smartgrids, one could imagine using the bookmarking 
mechanism to make social participation more visible and involve people in energy infrastructure 
design and operation by communication of their major expectations and needs, as well as to take 
into account their feedback during system updates. In this view, emergence process driven in 
reasonable proportion between social participation and central authority will make Smartgrids more 
resilient to environmental changes without losing their functional capacity.  
!A	"BB	F
Adaptive learning is a challenge-response property which results from the tradeoff between 
consumer involvement and control by the central authority in the energy management process. On 
one side, intense consumer involvement can initiate chaotic behavior in the electrical system; on the 
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opposite side, strong control by the central authority renders the system rigid, missing opportunities 
for service efficiency, and exercise of the system’s resilience and adaptation capacity. These raise 
the uncertainties in the level of extent of adaptive learning property in Smartgrids, as well as in the 
suitable functioning of its mechanism.  
# "ECA	EFE$AB	
Smartgrids may be exposed to vulnerabilities emerging from the growth mechanisms of the system. 
Restricted by technical constraints and transmission capacity, the extension of current electricity 
grids is done by preferential attachment, whereby highly connected nodes attract new links.  This is 
a typical mechanism of growth of complex networks of different nature (Barabasi, Albert, & Jeong, 
2000; Boccaletti, Latora, Y. Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006). The result of this particular 
mechanism of growth is that it reinforces the ‘scale-free’ nature of electrical systems and, as a 
consequence, makes them vulnerable to directed attacks and propagation of cascading failures. This 
means that electricity system growth must be carefully monitored in order to anticipate possible 
critical decision points at which infrastructure development must be steered in a preferred direction. 
In this sense, the resilient mechanism for electricity infrastructure growth is likely to be based on 
the repulsion process between the hubs at all length scales, when the hubs prefer to grow by 
connections to less-connected nodes (Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2006). On the other hand, user 
involvement in the energy management process may cause drastic shifts in system evolution, 
leading to unexpected events and system vulnerabilities. 
%&E
The extent of system exposure to chaos is related to the level of influence of the controlling central 
authority.  In the case of Smartgrids, chaos may arise mainly after the integration process, due to the 
influence of system-affecting non-engineering factors which are difficult to forecast and control, 
including social acceptance and participation. Given the nature of these factors, modeling scenarios 
of chaotic behavior at the design stage is a challenging forecasting problem of multidisciplinary 
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nature, since realistically the major interrelations among elements arise after system 
implementation.  
'(CA				BA	E
The nature and dynamics of multidisciplinary relations which will affect the Smartgrids life cycle 
are difficult to forecast and control, and the related uncertainties may hide potential vulnerabilities. 
)*FCBEC	B
Imprecise definition of Smartgrid boundaries at the design stage driven by ‘preconceived’ 
engineering views on current energy challenges results in losses of information about the patterns of 
interconnections with influencing non-technical factors and their possible underestimation. Even in 
the case of well-engineered, smart electricity management, vulnerabilities in Smartgrid systems can 
arise if relevant influencing factors are neglected, e.g. social involvement and participation in the 
design and operation processes. 
BB	FAA+B	AB
These two properties were underlined as specific Smartgrids characteristics within adaptive learning 
and are considered as challenge-response characteristics. In the case of their strong influence, the 
adaptive learning property will dominate the evolution process and obstruct system upgrades, which 
will be restrictive for Smartgrids development. Therefore, these properties must be considered 
carefully. 
2.4. Vulnerability ranking 
Most of the complexity characteristics discussed in the previous Section are candidate sources of 
Smartgrid system vulnerability.. Their ranking with respect to their potential impact on the most 
valuable system resources and functionalities of electrical network is an objective of vulnerability 
assessment, because it can guide allocation and protection at the design and operation phases. 
However, at this stage of development of the Smartgrid concept, ranking vulnerabilities by the 
importance of their expected impact would be an unhelpfully abstract exercise. A preliminary 
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qualitative ranking could follow the categorization of Smartgrids complexity characteristics of 
Table 1 and their mapping into inherent, challenge-response and acquired categories, each of them 
related to the engineering, updating and integration processes of Smartgrids as complex engineered 
systems. The engineering process can be regarded as providing the designer with full control of a 
given Smartgrid’s topological and behavioral properties. In this view, in this first category the 
characteristics manifesting vulnerabilities could be subordinated and their consequences reduced. In 
the updating process, the level of designer involvement is lower and the vulnerabilities to which 
Smartgrids may be exposed are more difficult to control and avoid, without intervening associated 
environments, e.g. social and economic contexts. The second category regroups vulnerabilities of 
more unforeseen character than at the engineering stage. The last category expresses the most 
uncertain characteristics of Smartgrids, capable of producing echo effects in different contexts with 
consequences which are difficult to predict.  For this reason these characteristics are considered to 
potentially highly lead to vulnerable states of Smartgrid systems.  
3. Methods of vulnerability analysis 
This Section takes a comparative approach to exploration of options for modeling and analysis of 
the vulnerability characteristics of Smartgrid systems (Kroger & Zio, 2011). By taking into account 
the peculiarities of Smartgrid infrastructures, some methods regarded as most suitable have been 
selected. Obviously, statistical analysis of generation and failure records cannot be used at the 
current early stage of Smartgrid systems development to predict failures and time lapses between 
them. Also, the probabilistic analysis approach, used to model and predict the stochastic system 
state transition process may be difficult to pursue for such large systems with many multi-state 
components linked in complex patterns of interconnections.  
The methods selected for the purposes of this paper’s discussion are risk analysis, complex network 
theory and agent-based modeling and simulation (Table 2). The description of these approaches is 
organized as follows: for each method we supply a brief definition of the problem it addresses, and 
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analysis procedure and results are provided; finally, advantages and disadvantages for the analysis 
of Smartgrid systems are briefly discussed and synthesized in Table 2. 
3.1. Risk analysis 
 
Risk analysis of complex systems aims at the identification of vulnerabilities for complex systems, 
prioritizing them according to a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators. The 
procedure for the analysis of network systems like Smartgrids is based on logical structural 
modeling by directed or undirected graphs and analysis of structural particularities under different 
uncertainty scenarios. Vulnerability ranking can be based on heuristic risk factors at the component 
level, which are the combination of complexity and severity indicators at the system level (Yacoub 
& Ammar, 2001).  
The risk analysis framework is poorly suited to analysis of Smartgrids and large-scale electricity 
systems in general, which hold multidisciplinary connections and can experience a very large 
number of scenarios of uncertain occurrence, development and consequence. For this reason, 
application of risk analsys is limited to simplified case studies. Examples of suitable case studies 
include the analysis of the chaotic behavior of a complex industrial system in terms of stochastic 
variations in its technical parameters (Bruzzone, 2004) and the analysis of existing multidisciplinary 
relations in the context of project management environment (Biffl, Moser, & Winkler, 2010).  
3.2. Complex network theory 
 
Complex network theory provides a means for representing the inherent structural characteristics of 
large-scale networks (Boccaletti, Latora, Y. Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006). It also allows 
describing the architecture evolution and growth mechanisms (Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2006; Watts 
& Strogatz, 1998).  Complex network theory also provides some connections to non-engineering 
domains, for example, by taking into account geographical and social constraints (Barth, 2010). In 
this view, most challenge-response and acquired characteristics are considered by this approach.  
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Yet, complex network theory can be used mostly for a preliminary vulnerability analysis limited to 
capturing the topological and behavioral bottlenecks of Smartgrids (Kroger & Zio, 2011). The 
approach consists in modeling by unweighted graphs the topological configuration of the network 
(Watts & Strogatz, 1998). For accounting of the electricity networks characteristics, weighted and 
planar graphs can be used (Boccaletti, Latora, Y. Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006).  Weighted 
graphs allow including the heterogeneous characteristics of components and interconnections, while 
planar graphs enable introducing technical, social and geographical constraints in the analysis. 
3.3. Agent-based modeling and simulation 
The agent-based model and simulation approach allows, in principle, for accurate representation of 
complex dynamic systems. The agent-based method is capable of simulating almost all challenge-
response and acquired characteristics of Smartgrids. Table 2 provides relevant examples of the 
diverse properties which can be simulated by agent-based methods. The integration of physical 
models for the representation of engineering and non-engineering factors with their complex 
relations, must be rendered computationally feasible in order to represent realistically the complex 
behaviors of large-scale systems in reasonable times (Kroger & Zio, 2011).  
However, the accurate representation of multiple components and connections in multiple agents 
appears to be a complicated task, with a large number of parameters whose values need to be 
determined on the basis of data and information that may be unavailable for some components and 
connections. It is therefore expected that for Smartgrids, the agent-based approach can be used for 
studying only specific geographically limited areas of vulnerability in the system (Kroger & Zio, 
2011). 
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Table 2. 
Categorization of approaches for vulnerability assessment of Smartgrids 
Characteristics/Analysis 
method 
Risk analysis Complex network theory Agent-based modeling and simulation 
A
cq
u
ire
d 
Self-organization and 
decomposability 
No  No Yes (Grimm & Railsback, 2006; Wolf, 
Holvoet, & Leuven, 2003)  
Emergence  No No Yes (Kroger & Zio, 2011; Schlapfer, 
Kessler, & Kroger, 2008)  
Chaos  Only for engineering analysis 
(Bruzzone, 2004)  
No Yes (Wolf, Holvoet, & Leuven, 2003)  
Multidisciplinary 
relations 
In analysis of multi-disciplinary 
projects management (Biffl, Moser, & 
Winkler, 2010)  
Partly with planar graphs (Barth, 2010; 
Waxman, 2002)  
Yes (Grimm & Railsback, 2006; 
Schlapfer, Kessler, & Kroger, 2008)  
Vague boundaries No No No 
Ch
al
le
n
ge
-
re
sp
o
n
se
 
Self-healing and 
attacks resistance 
No No No 
Adaptive learning No No Yes (Grimm & Railsback, 2006)  
Evolution and growth No Selective pressure and preferential 
attachment mechanism (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998), hub repulsion growth 
(Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2006)  
Yes (Mitchell & Newman, 2002)  
In
he
re
n
t 
Architecture  Graph theory for complex systems 
modeling and further analysis with 
heuristic risk measures (Kroger & Zio, 
2011; Yacoub & Ammar, 2001)  
Generation of complex infrastructures 
with graphs theory (Boccaletti, Latora, Y. 
Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006; Watts 
& Strogatz, 1998)  
Accurate and realistic simulation model 
of dynamic complex systems including 
physical laws (Kroger & Zio, 2011)  
Heterogeneity of 
elements and 
connections 
Weighted graph concept (Wilson & 
Boyd, 2008)  
Weighted graphs (Boccaletti, Latora, Y. 
Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006)  
Explicit modeling of autonomous agents 
and their interactions 
Self-similarities No Kronecker product graph model (S. 
Moreno, Kirshner, Neville, & 
Vishwanathan, 2010)  
Yes (Batty, 2007)  
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5. Conclusions  
We have looked at Smartgrids from an original point of view of understanding their complexity. 
Topological and behavioral characteristics ‘typical’ of complex systems have been considered in the 
context of their instantiation in a typical or ideal Smartgrid. Further categorization of these 
characteristics has been made with regards to the engineering, updating and integration processes, 
which characterize a system life cycle. The indications that arise concern mainly the uncertain 
impact, that these complexity characteristics may have on Smartgrids vulnerabilities, and the 
possibility to foresee it, counteract and avoid vulnerability factors. System-acquired properties are 
considered most uncertain, and thus most difficult to control. Inherent characteristics, shaped 
mostly during design stage, do not pose particular vulnerabilities, and may be easier to avoid. 
Challenge-response properties occupy an intermediate position between inherent and acquired 
characteristics.  
The analysis of the methods available for the vulnerability assessment of complex engineered 
systems has taken into account the ranking of Smartgrids vulnerabilities. Complex network theory 
seems suitable for preliminary analysis and identification of critical areas, with agent-based 
modeling following up as most adapted to the detailed study of the identified vulnerable zones.  
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